How the EU's Energy Rift with Russia is Reshaping Eurasia and Accelerating BRICS Consolidation?

Three years after the Nord Stream pipelines were sabotaged, the scale of the price shock has become clear: the cumulative opportunity cost for the EU's gas market in 2022–2024 has reached hundreds of billions of dollars, according to detailed calculations provided by "Nezavisimaya Gazeta." Simultaneously, Eurasia is seeing a strengthening of the agenda for sovereignty and bloc cooperation, which is discussed by the Valdai Club, setting a political framework for the energy sector and trade among BRICS+ countries.

What Figures Illustrate the Cost of the EU's Abandonment of Russian Pipeline Gas?

The total opportunity cost for the EU's gas market in 2022–2024 is estimated at $295.1 billion, based on actual consumption and average annual gas prices that significantly exceeded the pre-COVID 2018 level, as calculated by "Nezavisimaya Gazeta."

In a hypothetical scenario where Nord Stream 2 (an additional 55 billion cubic meters per year, about 14% of EU consumption in 2021) had been launched, the average price could have returned to ~ $222 per 1,000 cubic meters (the 2018 level) compared to the actual ~ $515 in 2022–2024; the "lost savings" on this volume amount to approximately $48.3 billion over three years. The cost of Nord Stream 2 itself is $10.45 billion, which is four times less than the "lost profit" according to the same article.

Who Won and Who Lost in the Short Term?

The short-term winners are American LNG exporters, whose share in EU LNG imports increased from 27% (about 22 billion cubic meters) in 2021 to 44% (about 51 billion cubic meters) in 2024. Meanwhile, EU imports of Russian pipeline gas from 2021–2023 "collapsed" by more than 100 billion cubic meters per year, as recorded by "Nezavisimaya Gazeta."

For the EU, this meant overheating prices and budgetary strain, although with a GDP of $18.98 trillion (2024), the region is capable of "digesting" such surges. For Russia, it meant a loss of tariff revenues but spurred a drive for restructuring: developing the domestic market, increasing the share of LNG, and deepening ties with "friendly" markets. The article also suggests that Europe may receive Russian LNG through "parallel imports"—indirect supply chains.

How is the EU-Russia Energy Rift Accelerating Bloc Trade and the Role of BRICS?

The main strategic shift is the normalization of bloc logic and the prioritization of sovereignty, where energy becomes both a tool and an object of policy. This is the framework for Eurasia outlined by the Valdai Club: mutual recognition and sovereignty as conditions for a stable order, coupled with increasing pressure on partners, compelling them to make choices.

It is unlikely that we can expect the international order to replicate "ideal" models. Greater Eurasia will need to develop its own criteria for successful coexistence.

What Practical Signals of BRICS Consolidation Are Visible Right Now?

New platforms for business and regional cooperation are emerging: on Oct. 14, a press conference on BRICS country partnerships will be held in St. Petersburg, with expected participation from heads of industry and business unions, as reported by Interfax. Concurrently, "soft" channels and value-added chains are strengthening—from fashion to creative industries: Russia's MHPI presented a collection that grew out of the BRICS fashion show and contracts with Brazilian partners, as covered by ArtMoskovia.

What Tactical Risks and Opportunities Lie on the Horizon for BRICS Companies in the Next 6–18 Months?

Key risks and windows of opportunity stem from the current trajectory of prices and policies, as described in "Nezavisimaya Gazeta's" calculations and scenarios on EU and Russian energy.

• Risks: Expansion of sanctions and tariff pressure on the Russian Federation's energy sector and counterparties; political and diplomatic pressure on buyers of Russian hydrocarbons; creation of tension points along routes and in purchasing countries.
• Risks: Adaptation of the "green agenda" to Western competitive interests as a tool to displace non-Western exporters; use of public and private legal mechanisms against projects and management.
• Opportunities: On the supply side—acceleration of LNG projects (including the transport segment), decentralized gas generation, and gas chemistry; demand for energy efficiency and physical security solutions for energy infrastructure.
• Opportunities: Development of high-margin downstream products from hydrocarbons (including food and complex chemicals) in the Russian domestic market and in "friendly" jurisdictions; preparation for growth in the global gas balance (0.6% annually until 2050 according to BP's baseline scenario, cited in the article).
• Opportunities: Institutional formats of BRICS/SCO as platforms for contracting, standardization, and "transporting" sovereign rules of the game among Eurasian participants.

In essence: the price shock in the EU has acted as a catalyst for the redistribution of flows in favor of LNG and has accelerated the "bloc" logic on the continent. For BRICS businesses, this implies a pragmatic dual agenda—hedging against sanctions risks and systematically increasing presence in gas, LNG, gas chemistry, and energy efficiency value chains, where a window of opportunity is already open and is supported by growing institutional activity.